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LANDLORD-TENANT-IMPLIED

WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY AND

FITNESS-THE REALITIES OF CONTEMPORARY RENTAL AGREEMENTS
REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY AND FITNESS As A JUST AND NECESSARY IMPLICATION FROM

A LEASE
Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969).
THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF

OF

A

DWELLING.

Lemle v.

Plaintiff entered into a written lease agreement as lessee of a furnished dwelling house for a term of nine months. The plaintiff-lessee
had ample opportunity to inspect the premises prior to signing the
agreement. The lessee paid deposit and advance rent and took immediate possession of the dwelling. During the first night of occupancy,
plaintiff found that the house was infested with rats, and the defendant-lessor's subsequent attempts to remedy the problem by employing
exterminators failed. As a result, three days after occupying the dwelling, plaintiff vacated the premises and brought suit to recover the
deposit and rent. The trial judge ruled for plaintiff on the basis of
constructive eviction and breach of an implied warranty of habitability
and fitness for use. Held-Affirmed. The realities of contemporary
rental agreements require the application of implied warranty of habitability and fitness as a just and necessary implication from the contractual nature of a lease of a dwelling.
Transactions regarding the sale or lease of real estate have traditionally been surrounded with legal fictions resulting from the application
of common law rules. The majority of these legal fictions no longer
have any practical function, and when they are applied to contemporary
property agreements, legal problems and lay confusion are usually the
result.' A good example of such a legal fiction is the doctrine of constructive eviction as applied to the law governing landlord-tenant
transactions.2 The doctrine of constructive eviction was created by the
3
courts to ease harsh results produced by the operation of caveat emptor.
The lease transaction was subjected to the limitations of caveat emptor
primarily because property law traditionally regards the lease as a sale
of the estate for a term. This "sale of the estate for a term" was based
upon mutual promises between the parties; however, contrary to ordinary contract law, these promises were not regarded as mutually conditional and dependent.4 The combination of caveat emptor and non1 Pound, The Cause of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29
A.B.A. REP. 895, 403-408 (1906).
2Simon, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Tenants' Association, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 1160, 1164 (1969).
8 Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URBAN
L. 695, 704 (1969).
4 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 686 (1960); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 890 (3d ed. 1962).
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mutual dependency place an onerous burden on the prospective tenant
to protect himself by the limited remedies of prior inspection and
express warranty. If the tenant fails to protect himself by these remedies
his sole relief is constructive eviction. 5
Constructive eviction, due to its limited nature, has been a rather
dubious relief for the tenant.6 Therefore, in an attempt to do justice,
the courts have turned to the doctrine of implied warranty.7 Implied
warranty is the antithesis of caveat emptor; consequently, its application
in this field of law is a direct attack upon the applicability of caveat
emptor in lease agreements. 8 This attack is not a recent development;
for over one hundred years there has existed an accelerating trend in
case and statutory law to eliminate the application of caveat emptor
in property law.9
The doctrine of caveat emptor is predicated on the theory that all
parties have an equal opportunity to acquire information and knowledge of the object of the transaction, and therefore, no affirmative duty
to inform regarding defects exists. Justification for the doctrine is based
upon the right of the vendee or lessee to a prior inspection and the
protection of express warranty. Therefore, the sole duty upon the vendor or lessor is to make known latent defects that fall within the constructive knowledge rule. In the absence of express provisions to the
contrary, he has no other affirmative duty in this field. 10
The application of implied warranty of habitability and fitness for
use is the exception rather than the general rule in property law."' It
is widely accepted, however, that a short term lease of a furnished
dwelling carries with it an implied warranty that the premises are habitable.' 2 The exception arose when the courts recognized that the existence of certain facts and circumstances defeated the basic reasoning
behind the application of caveat emptor. The fact that leased premises
are furnished logically defeats the fiction that the landlord had no
5See Perez v. Raybaud, 76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177 (1890); Lesar, Landlord and Tenant
Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279, 1285 (1960).
0 Simon, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Tenants' Association,
47 TEXAs L. REV. 1160, 1164 n. 29 (1969).
7 Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Hawaii 1969); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d
268 (N.J. 1969); Buckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (App. Super. Ct. L.A. 1967); Pines
v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1961); Delamater v. Foreman, 239 N.W. 148 (Minn.
1931); Young v. Povich, 116 A. 26 (Maine 1922); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 31 N.E. 286 (Mass.
1892); Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843); Collins v. Barrow, 174 Eng. Rep.
38 (Ex. 1831).
8 Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
9 Cf. Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Pines v. Perssion, Ill N.W.
2d 409 (Wis. 1961). Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches, 54 CAL. L. REV. 670 (1966); Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent
Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961)..
10 Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for a Change, 54 GEO. L.J.
519 (1966).
11 Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URBAN

L. 695, 704 (1969).

12 E.g., Ingalls v. Hobbs, 31 N.E. 286 (Mass. 1892).
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knowledge of the intended use of the premises. Since the lease is short
term, there is no justification for the idea that the tenant may change
his intended use. It also evidences the tenant's intent to take immediate
possession, which limits his right to a prior inspection." The exception
is based on pure logic and the realities surrounding the landlord-tenant
agreement. Ironically, for some illogical reason (except in isolated
instances) the exception has not been extended to cover any long term
lease of dwellings, or any lease of unfurnished dwellings. 14 Its sole expansion has been in areas of multidwelling apartments," and possibly
into very specific situations partially governed by the lease agreement.18
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Hawaii was faced with the
classic fact situation for application of the short term exception. After a
scholarly discussion of the exception and implied warranty in general,
the court concluded that the exception was artificial-that it in no way
clarified or solved the problems found in modern landlord-tenant
controversies. The court then focused its attention to the heart of the
problem, i.e., caveat emptor, and found that it had no theoretical or
practical value in modern urban realities, and that it was no longer
applicable. 17 The court then attacked the doctrine of constructive
eviction declaring:
The doctrine of constructive eviction, as an admitted judicial
fiction designed to operate as though there were a substantial
breach of a material covenant in a bilateral contract, no longer
serves its purpose when the more flexible concept of implied warranty of habitability is legally available.'
Justification for such sweeping decisions can be found in a number
of legal trends regarding common law. 19 The Lemle case based its
decision primarily on the growing theory that law must take into consideration its pragmatic relative nature. The court declared:
[I]t appears to us that no search for gaps and exceptions in a legal
doctrine such as constructive eviction which exists only because
of the somnolence of the common law and the courts is to perpetuate further judicial fictions when preferable alternatives exist.
13 Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 670, 673-678 (1966).
14 Id.
15 E.g., Delamater v. Foreman, 239 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1931).
16 Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 124 N.W.2d 651 (Wis. 1963); Young v. McClintic, 26
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933, holding approved).
17 Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 473 (Hawaii 1969).
18 Id. at 475.
19 Cf. Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1279 (1960); Garrity, Re.
designing Landlord.Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URBAN L. 695 1969);
Simon, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Tenants' Association,
47 TExAs L. REv. 1160 (1969).
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We do not agree with Blackstone that "[t]he law of real property
... is formed into a fine artificial system, full of unseen connections and nice dependencies, and he that breaks one link of the
chain endangers the dissolution of the whole." (Citation omitted)
•.. The law of landlord-tenant relations cannot be so frail as to
shatter when confronted with modern urban realities and a frank
appraisal of the underlying issues. 20
The doctrine of caveat emptor has been under attack in American
jurisdiction since an early date. In Wintz v. Morrison,21 involving the
sale of personal property, the Texas Supreme Court noted the trend
of nineteenth century decisions that limited the operation of caveat
emptor in sales by application of implied warranty. Since the Wintz
decision, the limitations placed on caveat emptor in the sale of chattels
22
have rendered it virtually impotent.
This attack on caveat emptor has not been limited to the sale of
personal property, for recently there have been decisions regarding its
application in the area of real estate. The leading case in Texas is
Humber v. Morton,23 which concerns implied warranty in the sale of
new houses. In Humber, Justice Norvell declared: "The caveat emptor
rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism patently out of harmony with modern home buying practices. ' 24 The Supreme Court of
Texas reasoned that modern practices logically required the application
of implied warranty of fitness in the sale of new homes. "If at one time
in Texas the rule of caveat emptor had application to the sale of a new
house by a vendor-builder, that time is now past." 25 This approach to
implied warranty in the sale of new homes appears to be rapidly becoming the majority rule. 26 The majority of these decisions are reached
by considering the logical and practical need for such change. The
evidence of this concept can be seen by such statements as: "Ancient
distinctions which make no sense in today's society and tend to discredit
the law should be readily rejected . . ..
The court in Lemle could see no logical or practical reason why such
a concept could not operate equally well in the field of lease agreements.
Their application of this concept to lease agreements is supported by
20 462 P.2d at 475.
21 17 Tex. 372 (1856).

22 The Orgin Lecture delivered during Law Week at the University of Texas School
of Law, May 1969. Green, The Law Must Respond to the Environment, appears in 47
TXAs L. Rav. 1327 (1969).

426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 561.
See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554, 25 A.L.R.3d 372 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
27 Schlpper v. Levitt & Sons, 207 A.2d 314, 325 (N.J. 1965). See Carpenter v. Donohoe,
388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964).
23
24
25
26
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a number of authorities dealing with contemporary tenant problems. 28
In Pines v. Perssion, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in
leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social
desirability of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid
to be rebuffed by that obnoxipopulation increase is too important
29
ous legal clich6, caveat emptor.'
This approach to the perplexing problems of urban housing has as its
stated goal laws that consider the realities of urban life and the reformation of rights and remedies to better govern these realities. For
this reason the court in Lemle rejected the doctrine of constructive
eviction because it can no longer protect the urban tenant. s0 The acute
housing shortage in our urban areas has aggravated the inherent limitations of the doctrine of constructive eviction to such an extent that it
has no practical value as a remedy for a large percentage of urban
dwellers. 3' An advantage found in the application of implied warranties
of habitability and fitness for use is the wide range of alternatives presented by the basic contract remedies. Constructive eviction, on the
other hand, has limited application as an affirmative remedy for damages. This can be traced to a number of causes, the most important being the tenant's own financial problems, and the intricacies of proof
and procedure that surround the action. 2 As a defense, constructive
eviction is based on a failure of consideration. To insure its application
against a suit by his landlord, the tenant must have 3 the knowledge of
Socrates, the patience of Job, and a very good lawyer.
The traditional view of implied warranty of habitability is that the
84
landlord warrants the fitness at the time the tenant takes possession.
The problem of subsequent defect raises a question regarding repairs.
28 See Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 474 n.2 (Hawaii 1969).

29Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W. 2d 409, 412-413 (Wis. 1961). Accord, Reste Realty Corp.
v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268 (N.J. 1969); Buckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. L.A. 1967); Delamater v. Foreman, 239 N.W. 148 (Minn. 1931); Collins v.
Hopkins [1923] 2 K.B. 617. Contra, Cameron v. Calhoun-Smith Distributing Com. 442
S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ).
80 Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (Hawaii 1969).
81 Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279 (1960); Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URBAN L. 695 (1969).
82 Id.
33 Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URBAN
L. 695, 702-704 (1969); Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279, 1281-

1284 (1960); Simon, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Tenants'

Association, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 1160, 1164 (1969). But see Ravet v. Garlick, 190 N.W. 637
(Mich. 1922). In this case partial eviction as a defense was not waived by tenant's failure
to abandon the premises.
34 See Simon, Tenant Interest Representation: Proposal for a National Tenants' Association, 47 TExAs L. REV. 1160 (1969).
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